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Present:	
	
•  UAS	Integra6on	into	the	NAS	
•  RTCA	SC	228	MOPS	and	Autonomy	
•  ICAO	RPAS	Panel	and	Autonomy	
	
Future:	
	
Single	operator	control	of	mul6ple	A/C	
Playbook	
Human-Autonomy	Teaming	
PaLerns	
HAT	Model		
Outline	
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Full	UAS	Integra6on	Vision	of	the	Future	
Manned	and	unmanned	aircra,	will	be	able	to	rou2nely	operate	
through	all	phases	of	ﬂight	in	the	NAS,	based	on	airspace	
requirements	and	system	performance	capabili2es.	
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UAS-NAS	Phase	2	
Project	Organiza6on	Structure	
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Staff Engineer  Dan Roth, AFRC
Systems Eng Lead TBD, TBD
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Command and Control (C2)
 
Subproject Manager
Mike Jarrell, GRC
Subproject Technical Lead
Jim Griner, GRC
Detect and Avoid (DAA)
Subproject Manager
Jay Shively, ARC
Subproject Technical Leads
Confesor Santiago, ARC; Lisa Fern, 
ARC; Tod Lewis, LaRC 
Integrated Test & Evaluation
Subproject Manager
Heather Maliska, AFRC
Subproject Technical Leads
Jim Murphy, ARC; Sam Kim, AFRC
EL
EM
NE
T/
TW
P 
LE
VE
L
Technical Work Packages (TWP): 
Terrestrial Extensions, Ka-band 
Satcom,  Ku-band Satcom, C-band 
Satcom
Technical Work Packages (TWP): 
Alternative Surveillance, Well Clear, 
ACAS Xu, External Collaboration, 
Integrated Events 
Technical Work Packages (TWP):, 
Integration of Technologies into 
LVC-DE, Simulation Planning and 
Integration, Integrated Flight Test
Project Support: Project Planning & Control
Lead Resource Analyst April Jungers, AFRC
Resource Analysts Winter Preciado, 
AFRC
Warcquel Frieson, ARC
Julie Blackett, GRC
Pat O’Neal, LaRC
Scheduler Irma Ruiz, AFRC
Risk Manager Jamie Turner, AFRC
Change/Doc. Mgmt Lexie Brown, AFRC
Admin Sarah Strahan, 
AFRC
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DAA	Opera6onal	Environments	
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60K’ MSL 
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10K’ MSL 
500’ AGL 
MINIMUM ENROUTE 
ALTITUDE 
Cooperative 
Traffic 
Non-cooperative  
Aircraft 
HALE aircraft 
Ground Based  
Radar 
UAS Ground 
Control Station 
GBSAA Data 
Alternative 
DAA Sensors 
ACAS Xu 
Airborne Radar 
Class 2 & 3 
UAS DAA System for Transition 
to Operational Altitude  
(> 10kft MSL) 
C2 Datalink 
DAA System for  
Operational Altitudes 
(> 500ft AGL) 
Terminal Area Ops 
Legend	
Current	Research	Areas	(FY14-	FY16)	
Proposed	Research	Areas	(FY17	–	FY20)	
•  Phase	I	MOPS	RTCA	SC-	228	complete	and	published	(March,	
2017)	
–  Transi6on	to	Class	A	airspace	
–  DAA	MOPS	
–  On-board	RADAR	MOPS	
–  C2	Terrestrial	Radio	MOPS	
	
•  Phase	2	(2021)	
–  Opera6on	in	Class	C,	D	
–  Terminal	Area	Opera6ons	
–  Low	SWAP	A/C,	sensors	
–  GBSAA		
Status	
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General.	When	weather	condi6ons	permit,	regardless	of	
whether	an	opera6on	is	conducted	under	instrument	ﬂight	rules	
or	visual	ﬂight	rules,	vigilance	shall	be	maintained	by	each	
person	opera6ng	an	aircra`	so	as	to	see	and	avoid	other	aircra`.	
When	a	rule	of	this	sec6on	gives	another	aircra`	the	right-of-
way,	the	pilot	shall	give	way	to	that	aircra`	and	may	not	pass	
over,	under,	or	ahead	of	it	unless	well	clear.	
Piloted	“see	and	avoid”	=	UAS	“detect	and	avoid”	
	
Pilots	vision	replace	by	sensors	(on-	or	oﬀ-	board	or	both)	
	
Pilot	judgment	of	well	clear	=	mathema6cal	expression	of	well	
clear	
	
Horz	Miss	Distance	=	4000`;	Vert	Miss	Distance	=	450`;	
	modTau	=	35sec;	DMOD	=	4000`	
See	and	Avoid:		FAR	Sec.	91.113	
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Two	Func6ons:	
	
1)  Maintain	well	clear	
1)  See	and	avoid	
	
	
2)  Collision	Avoidance	
1)  TCAS	
2)  ACAS-Xu	
DAA	
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Background	
•  An	early	cri6cal	ques6on	for	the	Phase	I	MOPS	for	DAA	systems	
was	what,	if	any,	level	of	DAA	maneuver	guidance	would	be	
required	to	support	acceptable	performance	on	maintaining	well	
clear?	
•  Phase	I	MOPS	assump6ons	specify	that	the	pilot	in	command	will	
execute	maneuvers	to	remain	well	clear	
–  i.e.,	No	automa6c/autonomous	DAA	capability	
•  Display	types	given	level/type	of	maneuver	guidance:	
–  Informa2ve:	Provides	essen6al	informa6on	of	a	hazard	that	the	remote	
pilot	may	use	to	develop	and	execute	an	avoidance	maneuver.		No	
maneuver	guidance	automa6on	or	decision	aiding	is	provided	to	the	pilot		
–  Sugges2ve:	Automa6on	provides	a	range	of	poten6al	resolu6on	
maneuvers	to	avoid	a	hazard	with	manual	execu6on.	An	algorithm	provides	
the	pilot	with	maneuver	decision	aiding	regarding	advantageous	or	
disadvantageous	maneuvers		
–  Direc2ve:	Automa6on	provides	speciﬁc	recommended	resolu6on	guidance	
to	avoid	a	hazard	with	manual	or	automated	execu6on.	An	algorithm	
provides	the	pilot	with	speciﬁc	maneuver	guidance	on	when	and	how	to	
perform	the	maneuver		
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Dra`	MOPS	Informed	by	HITLs:	
Surveillance	Range	
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Time	un5l		CPA	
Well	Clear	
	Threshold	
(~35	sec)	
Aircra,		
Maneuver	Time	
(~30	sec)	
~35	sec	~65	sec	
NMAC	
0	sec	~80	sec	~90	sec	
Pilot	
Response	Time	
(~15	sec)	
ATC	Interac5on	
Time	
(~10	sec)	
Latency	
TOTAL	RESPONSE	TIME:	
Detect	Intruders	
Pilots	Determine	Resolu5on	
Nego5ate	Clearance	with	ATC	and	uplink	
maneuver	to	aircra,	
Approximate	detec5on	
range	=	8	nm	
Approximate	detec5on	
range	=	6	nm	
Aler6ng	
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Symbol	 Name	 Pilot	Ac6on	 Buﬀered	Well	Clear	Criteria	
Time	to	Loss	of	Well	
Clear	
Aural	Alert	
Verbiage	
TCAS	RA	
•  Immediate	ac2on	required	
•  Comply	with	RA	sense	and	ver6cal	rate	
•  No6fy	ATC	as	soon	as	prac6cable	a`er	
taking	ac6on	
*DMOD	=	0.55	nmi	
*ZTHR	=	600	`	
*modTau	=	25	sec	
0	sec	(+/-	5	sec)	
(TCPA	approximate:	
25	sec)	
“Climb/Descend”	
4	 DAA	Warning	Alert	
•  Immediate	ac2on	required	
•  No6fy	ATC	as	soon	as	prac6cable	a`er	
taking	ac6on	
DMOD	=	0.75	nmi	
HMD	=	0.75	nmi	
ZTHR	=	450	`	
modTau	=	35	sec	
25	sec	
(TCPA	approximate:	
60	sec)	
“Traﬃc,	
Maneuver	Now”		
x2	
3	 Correc6ve	DAA	Alert	
•  On	current	course,	correc2ve	ac2on	
required	
•  Coordinate	with	ATC	to	determine	an	
appropriate	maneuver	
DMOD	=	0.75	nmi	
HMD		=	0.75	nmi	
ZTHR	=	450	`	
modTau	=	35	sec	
55	sec	
(TCPA	approximate:	
90	sec)	
	
“Traﬃc,	Avoid”	
2	 Preven6ve	DAA	Alert	
•  On	current	course,	correc6ve	ac6on	
should	not	be	required	
•  Monitor	for	intruder	course	changes	
•  Talk	with	ATC	if	desired	
DMOD	=	0.75	nmi	
HMD	=	1.0	nmi	
ZTHR	=	700	`	
modTau	=	35	sec	
55	sec	
(TCPA	approximate:	
90	sec)	
“Traﬃc,	Monitor”	
1	 Guidance	Traﬃc	
•  No	ac5on	required	
•  Traﬃc	genera6ng	guidance	bands	
outside	of	current	course	
Associated	w/	
bands	outside	
current	course	
X	 N/A	
0	 None	(Target)	 •  No	ac5on	required	•  No	coordina6on	required	
Within	surveillance	
ﬁeld	of	regard	 X	 N/A	
*	These	values	show	the	Protec6on	Volume	(not	well	clear	volume)	at	MSL	5000-10000`	(TCAS	Sensi6vity	Level	5)	
Autonomous	CA	is	op5onal.	
	
Manufacturers	can,	if	desired,	automate	collision	avoidance	–	
much	as	Airbus	has	automated	TCAS	in	the	A380.	
	
	Autopilot	mode	to	execute	the	Resolu6on	Advisory.		
	
	No	ac6on	for	a	traﬃc	advisory.	
	
Autonomous	Maintain	Well	Clear	(MWC)	func6on	is	out	of	
scope.		Partly	because	the	solu6on	is	sugges5ve.	
	
Phase	2	–	closure	rates	are	slower,	but	A/C	are	closer,	aircra`	
are	less	agile	–	6melines	may	dictate	auto-DAA.		Ini6al	study	of	
the	trade	space	(OSU-Woods).	
DAA	Phase	1	MOPS	
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RPAS	Manual	on	Remotely	Piloted	Aircra`	(RPAS)	Doc	10019	
	
Autonomous	aircra`:		An	unmanned	aircra`	that	does	not	allow	
pilot	interven6on	in	the	management	of	the	ﬂight.	
	
Autonomous	Opera6on:		An	opera6on	during	which	a	remotely	
piloted	aircra`	is	opera6ng	without	pilot	interven6on	in	the	
management	of	the	ﬂight.	
	
and	
	
the	RPAS	Manual	on	Remotely	Piloted	Aircra6	(RPAS)	restricts	
the	scope	to	exclude	“autonomous	aircra`	and	their	opera6ons	
…”		
	
	
ICAO	
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However,	
	
Lost	link	opera6ons,	by	deﬁni6on,	are	opera6ng	without	pilot	
interven6on	(i.e.,	pilot	out	of	the	loop,	sec6on	2.13).		Therefore,	
based	on	the	descrip6ons	(sec6on	2.1)	and	the	restric6on	in	
scope,	lost	link	opera6ons	are	excluded	from	the	RPAS	panel	
scope.		However,	these	opera6ons	are	discussed	in	chapters	4,	
8,	9,	10,	11	and	14	of	the	RPAS	Manual.		
	
The	ICAO	deﬁni6on	of	autonomous	opera6ons	inadvertently	
excludes	lost	link	opera6ons.	
ICAO	
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System	
Characteris5c	
Pilot	can	intervene	 Pilot	can’t	
intervene	(lost	link)	
Pilot	can’t	
intervene	(design)	
Determinis6c	 Automa6on	 Automa6on*	 Automa6on	
Stochas6c	 HAT	 Autonomy	 Autonomy	
Automa6on	Table	
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Ability	of	pilot	to	intervene	
ICAO:			Automa6on	is	in	scope,	Autonomy	is	out	of	scope.	
	
*	Current	lost	link.	
•  LOA	
–  Sheridan	
–  Parasuraman,	Wickens	and	Sheridan	
•  Avia6on	Systems	
–  Aviate	
–  Navigate	
–  Communicate	
•  Phase	of	ﬂight	
–  T.O.	
–  En	route	
–  Approach	
–  Landing	
	
Waypoint	Naviga6on:	
RPAS	xx	is	automated	at	level	xx,	in	nav,	for	the	en	route	phase.	
Mul6-dimensional	nature	
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Single	operator	control	of	mul6ple	UAS	
	
DoD	–	AFRL	“Heterogeneous-UAS	Integra6on	in	a	single-
operator	VSCS	Environment	(HIVE)”	
	
UAS	EXCOM	Science	and	Research	Panel’s	(SARP)	-		Workshop	
on	mul6ple	UAS	controlled	by	a	single	 	operator,	June	27	&	
28.	
	
Boeing	–	“don’t	see	a	business	model	without	it.”	
	
Supervisory	control	–	a	step	before	network	management	
(UTM).	
	
	
Future	
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Delega6on	Control:	Playbook®	
•  Delega6on:	one	way	humans	manage	
supervisory	control	with	
heterogeneous,	intelligent	assets	
•  Playbook®:	ones	means	of	delega6on	
•  Plays:	analogous	to	football	
–  Quick	commands	–	complex	
ac6ons	
•  A	Play	provides	a	framework	
–  References	an	acceptable	range	of	
plan/behavior	alterna6ves	
–  Requires	shared	knowledge	of	
domain	Goals,	Tasks	and	Ac6ons	
–  Supervisor	can	further	constrain/
s6pulate	
•  Poten6ally	facilitates	intui6ve	
coopera6ve	control	of	Unmanned	
Systems	
A	page	from	Alonzo	Stagg’s	1927	Playbook	
Example:	Prosecute	Target	
Tools:		
Arm	laser	➔	Lase	target	➔	Send	coordinates	to	
weaponized	UAV	➔	Toggle	UAVs	➔	Arm	missile	
➔	Fire	
Scripts:		
Select	‘Lase’	script	➔Toggle	UAVs	➔	Arm	
weapons	➔	Fire	
Plays:		
Select	‘Prosecute	Target’	play	➔	Fire	
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Primary Task Performance (RT)
Target 
Acquisition
Target 
Prosecution
Shorter	Reac6on	Time	for	Plays	
Plays	had	lower	workload	Higher	Accuracy	for	Plays	
Levels	of	Automa5on	Simula5on	
Manned-Unmanned	Teaming:	MUM	
Level IV Control: 
Control of Payload and Vehicle 
Excluding Take-off and Landing 
Extend to simultaneous control of  
multiple heterogeneous UAS 
Manned-Unmanned	Teaming:	MUM	
Goals:	
•  Apply	Playbook®	methodology	
and	DelCon	lessons	learned	to	
helicopter	cockpit;	Test	in	
simula6on	
•  Increase	capability	and	eﬃciency	
of	UAS	control	by	helicopter	
pilots		
•  Supervisory	control	of	mul6ple,	
heterogeneous	UAS	
•  Develop	infrastructure	and	lay	
founda6on	for	later	eﬀorts	
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several	dimensions	
Flight	Demonstra6on	2009	
Ft.	Ord	CA,	23	APR	2009	
Goal:	
•  Demonstrates	ini6al	proof	of	concept	of	
Delega6on	Control	(Playbook)	in	ﬂight	–	
supervisory	control	of	mul6ple	air/ground	
assets	in	MOUT	Scenario	
Method:		
•  Live/Virtual	Demo	–	Controlling	RMAX,	CMU	
MAX	Rover	and	2	virtual	UAS	with	Delega6on	
Control	
•  Voice	RGN	Control	(USAF)	
Features:	
•  Delega6on	control	human-machine	interface	
supports	control	and	monitoring	4	payloads	
•  Automa6on	Transparency	
•  Live	UGV-UAV	coordina6on	for	slung	load	drop	
•  Reduced	operator	workload/high	situa6on	
awareness	
	
	
		
Live RMAX 
Virtual Shadow 
Virtual Sky Warrior 
Live CMU  
MAX Rover 
Flight	Demonstra6on	2011	
Ft.	Hunter-LiggeE	CA,	19	May	2011	
Purpose:	
•  Build	on	previous	simula6ons	and	ﬂight	test	
examining	single	operator	control	of	mul6ple	
heterogeneous	ground/air	unmanned	
systems	through	delega6on	control	
employment	
–  Operator	performance	data	collec6on/workload	
assessments	
–  Heterogeneous	ﬂight	assets:	Boeing	Scan	Eagle	and	
Yamaha	RMAX;	two	virtual	UAS	
–  Tes6ng	in	opera6onally	relevant	mission	scenarios	
–  Mul6-sensor	cross-cue	in	support	of	both	targe6ng	
and	convoy	support	
•  Army	AFDD/Boeing	CRADA	
Key	Objec6ve:		
•  Develop	and	test	DelCon	Top	Priority	Plays;	
route	recon,	convoy	support,	troops	in	
contact	
Demonstrated	in	numerous	simula6ons	and	ﬂight	tests	(even	
NOPE).	
•  AFRL	–	Base	security,	UAS	ground	sta6on	
•  RCO	–	Dispatch,	cockpit	
•  HAT	
Supervisory	Control	Summary	
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HAT	Agent	
HAT Agent
Operator
Interface
Display
Audio
Visual
Context 
- Time Pressure
- User Info
- more
Queries/Requests 
- A v. B
- Why?
- What If?
Automation
Plays
- Goals
- Risks to 
achieving goals
- Mitigations
Alerts
Context
Responses to Queries
- Alternatives
- Transparency info
  - Predicted Outcomes
  - Reasoning
  - Conﬁdence level
Transparency Info
Requests
Polling for Risks
Etiquette R
ules/C
ontextual 
Sensitivity
Authority Info
Scratch Pad
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Problems	with	Automa6on	
•  BriLle	
–  Automa6on	o`en	operates	well	for	a	range	of	situa6ons	but	requires	
human	interven6on	to	handle	boundary	condi6ons	(Woods	&	Cook,	
2006)	
•  Opaque	
–  Automa6on	interfaces	o`en	do	not	facilitate	understanding	or	tracking	
of	the	system	(Lyons,	2013)	
•  Miscalibrated	Trust	
–  Disuse	and	misuse	of	automa6on	have	lead	to	real-world	mishaps	and	
tragedies	(Lee	&	See,	2004;	Lyons	&	Stokes,	2012)	
•  Out–of-the-Loop	Loss	of	Situa6on	Awareness	
–  Trade-oﬀ:	automa6on	helps	manual	performance	and	workload	but	
recovering	from	automa6on	failure	is	o`en	worse	(Endsley,	2016;	
Onnasch,	Wickens,	Li,	Manzey,	2014)	
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HAT	Solu6ons	to	Problems	with	Automa6on	
•  BriLle	
–  Nego5ated	decisions	puts	a	layer	of	human	ﬂexibility	into	system	
behavior	
•  Opaque	
–  Requires	that	systems	be	designed	to	be	transparent,	present	ra5onale	
and	conﬁdence	
–  Communica6on	should	be	in	terms	the	operator	can	easily	understand	
(shared	language)	
•  Miscalibrated	Trust	
–  Automa6on	display	of	ra5onale	helps	human	operator	know	when	to	
trust	it	
•  Out–of-the-Loop	Loss	of	Situa6on	Awareness	
–  User	directed	interface;	adaptable,	not	adap6ve	automa6on	
–  Greater	interac6on	(e.g.,	nego5a5on)	with	automa6on	reduces	
likelihood	of	being	out	of	the	loop	
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Legend 
Human	Operator	
	
Intelligent	/	Cogni2ve	Agent	
	
Automated	Tools	
	
Communica2on	Only	
	
Supervisory	Rela2onship	
	
Coopera2ve	Rela2onship	
	
Co-loca2on	(e.g.,	onboard	an	airplane,	in	ground	staJon)	
Both	imply		
bi-direc2onal	
informa2on	ﬂow,		
usually	using	
automated	tools		
RCO	Use-Case	
FLYSKY12	is	en	route	from	SFO	to	BOS.	There	is	one	POB	and	a	dispatcher	
ﬂight	following.	
•  Onboard	automa6on	detects	fuel	imbalance	and	alerts	POB	and	dispatcher.	
•  POB	requests	automa6on	diagnose	fuel	imbalance.	Automa6on	reports	to	
POB	a	leak	in	le`	tank.		
•  POB	requests	that	agent	manage	fuel.	Agent	opens	the	cross	feed	and	turns	
oﬀ	the	pumps	in	the	right	side	to	draw	fuel	from	the	le`.		
•  POB	contacts	dispatch	about	need	to	divert.		
•  Dispatcher	requests	divert	planning	from	dispatch	automa6on.		
•  Dispatcher	uplinks	ﬂight	plan	to	POB.	POB	inspects	the	ﬂight	plan	and	
agrees.		
•  POB	requests	agent	coordinate	divert	with	ATC.	Agent	reports	divert	is	
approved.	POB	tells	agent	to	execute.		
Top-Level	Actor	Rela6onships	
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WObj:
Airline Flight
WObj:
Ground 
Operations
WO:
Aircraft
WObj:
ATC 
Operations
Worker Tools
Onboard
Pilot
Onboard
Agent
Ground
Agent
Worker Tools
ATC
Worker Tools
Ground 
Operator
Top-Level	System	Work	
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WObj:
Airline Flight
Airline Flight
WObj:
Ground 
Operations
WO:
Aircraft
WProc:
Airline Operations 
WObj:
ATC 
Operations
WPOut:
Fly aircraft
WPOut:
Telemetry data
Voice comm
WPOut:
Telemetry data
Voice comm
WPOut:
Direct traffic (e.g., clearances)
Provide information (e.g., traffic)
Voice comm
WPOut:
Alerts (e.g., weather) 
Mitigations (e.g., reroutes)
Voice comm
 Ground Operations
ATC Operations
Worker Tools
Onboard
Pilot
Onboard
Agent
Worker Tools
Ground 
Operator
Worker Tools
•  Autonomy	
–  Not	in	today’s	“approved”	UAS	
–  Words	MaLer	
•  ICAO	
	
•  Business	case	for	single	operator	supervisory	control	of	
mul6ple	UAS	
–  Playbook	delega6on	is	one	successful	method	
•  HAT	
–  Coopera6ve	agent	with	knowledge	of	work	domain	
–  Shared	world	knowledge	
–  Can	we	extended	to	network	supervision	
Summary	
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